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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM

AGENCY
Hospital Liability For The Torfious Acts of Its Doctors And Nurses
It is a general proposition that an employer is liable for the torts of his

employees committed in the course of employment.' In applying this rule to a
particular case, it is thus necessary to determine, (1) whether one is an employee,
and (2) whether the acts were committed in the course of employment. In regard
to the first requirement, the law in New York, until the last term, was that
hospitals were liable for the tortious administrative acts of doctors and nurses 2 but
that these same doctors and nurses, although "employed" full time, would not
render the hospital vicariously liable when performing medical acts. 3 This rule
was equally applicable to charitable and profit-making institutions 4-- the reason
finally resting on the ground that when performing medical acts the actors were

not employees but independent contractors and thus not within the doctrine of
respondeat superior.5
In Becker v. City of New York 6 the Court was faced with the problem of
liability of the state (or its subdivision-in this case New York City) for the
tortious medical acts of nurses "employed" in its hospital. In its anxiety to continue
restricting the applicability of the rule of hospital non-liability,7 the Court engaged
in peculiar statutory construction by stating that the legislature in enacting section 8
of the Court of Claims Act did not intend to apply the rule of hospital non1. See, e.g., Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike and R.R., 46 N.Y. 23 (1871).
2. Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940).

3. Schloendorff- v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92

(1914).
4. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, supra note 3 (charitable
hospital); Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51 (1951) (profit-making
hospital); Schneider v. New York Telephone Co., 249 App. Div. 400, 292 N.Y. Supp.
399 (1st Dep't 1937), affd, 276 N.Y. 655, 13 N.E.2d 47 (1938) (non-hospital corporation).
5. The courts in New York originally stated two reasons for non-liability. In
Hodern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910), the court said that
non paying patients waived any tort claim in accepting the care of charity. This
waiver theory was repudiated in Sheehan v. North Country Comnunity Hospital,
273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937). The second reason, as stated in Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, supra note 3, was that hospitals merely procure
services of doctors and nurses but do not undertake to render the services themselves through the agency of'the nurses and doctors.
6. 2 N.Y. 2d 226, 159 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1957).

7. The court in Berg v. New York Society for the Relief of the Ruptured

and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REv. 227 (1957).
held that the hospital was liable for the torts of non-professional employees even
though performing medical acts. In Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, 308 N.Y. 116,
123 N.E.2d 801 (1954), 5 BUFFALO L. REV. 168 (1956), the court restricted the
immunity to injuries resulting from a course of treatment and a corporation was
held liable for the negligent physical acts committed while examining a patient
as a condition of employment.
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liability to the states and its subdivisions.8 Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act
states:
The state . . . waives its immunity from liability and . . . assumes
liability . . . in accordance with the same rules of law as applied ...
against individuals or corporations .... (Emphasis added).
Absent such a statute, the state would not be liable for injuries resulting from the
negligence of its officers and agents.9 If the "evil" sought to be remedied was
sovereign immunity, can it be said that the legislative remedy was broader than
the "evil"'10 -that the state is to be liable although in the same situation a private
corporation would not be?" The Court, in effect, so held. This determination can
only be explained logically if the Court meant that doctors and nurses, at least
those employed full time, were employees even though engaged in medical acts
regardless of whether employed in a state, profit-making, or charitable hospital.
The Court, four months later, in Bing v. Thunig," concluded that full time doctors
and nurses in private hospitals were employees even when performing medical
acts. The reasoning of the Court was that hospitals attempt to cure patients and
not merely to make healers available-that nurses and doctors regularly worked
in hospitals in furtherance of the hospitals' purpose. These persons are engaged
not in their own enterprises but in the hospitals'. Therefore the hospitals should
3
bear the risk of their negligence.'
14
The rule of non-liability was originally applied to a charitable hospital,'
the Court fearing that liability might eventually destroy these institutions. 15
However, the reasoning of the rule'0 forced the Court into anomalies. The logic
demanded application also to profit-making organizations. 17 Then the Courts

8. In so holding the Court expressly stated what was implied when the court
in Robison v. New York, 292 N.Y. 631, 55 N.E.2d 506 (1944) affirmed a judgment
against the state for the tortious medical acts of a state physician, apparently
basing it on the reasoning of an earlier remand in the same case, 263 App. Div.
240, 32 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1942)-the reasoning being the same as In the
instant case.
9. Smith v. New York, 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
10. The state shall be liable only to the extent of a private Individual or
corporation. Douglas v. New York, 254 App. Div. 392, 394, 5 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683,
(3rd Dep't 1938).
11. As has been seen a non-state hospital whether charitable or profitmaking is not liable for the tortious medical acts of doctors and nurses. See notes
3, 4 supra.
12. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
13. For an economic basis for the theory of respondeat superior and what
factors to evaluate in determining whether one should be vicariously liable see,
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584, 720
(1929).
14. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, supra note 3.
15. Id. at'135, 105 N.E. at 95.
16. That is, that physicians and nurses are independent contractors when
treating patients.
17. Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium; Schneider v. New York Telephone Co., supra note 4.
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engaged in a compromise between total immunity and the doctrine of respondeat
superior,18 resulting in the distinction between medical and administrative acts. 19
Becker v. City of New York added more confusion by holding in substance that
the state and its subdivisions' liability was greater than a private hospitals'.
However, full cycle was finally reached, the Court in Bing v.Thunig discarding
the notion that the determination of whether a doctor or a nurse is an employee
depended on the nature of the acts performed rather than on the relationship
between the hospital and the nurse or doctor. As a result, there is no longer a
privilege for any type of hospital, whether state, charitable, or profit-making,
nor any necessity for making nice distinctions as to the nature of the act. The
Court upset precedent of many years to, ".... bring the common law of this state,
on this question, into accord with justice ....20
Non Enforceability Of Joint Venfure
"When individuals determine to conduct business through a corporation, ...
they are not at one and same time joint venturers and stockholders, fiduciaries and
nonfiduciaries, personally liable and not personally liable." This is the declaration
of the Court in Weisman v. Awnair Corporation of America,21 affirming the
Appellate Division's reversal 2 of an order of Supreme Court denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff brought an action for an injunction and an accounting against a
manufacturing corporation, its wholly-owned subsidiary distributing corporation,
and two individual defendants who were officers, directors and stockholders in the
manufacturing corporation, and with whom plaintiff had made an agreement that
he would organize a corporation which would be given the exclusive right to
distribute the manufacturer's product in a certain territory, the stock in the new
corporation to be issued sixty per cent to him and forty per cent to the individual
defendants or their nominees. He had organized the corporation and it had
operated for some time when the manufacturing corporation, on about seven
weeks notice, ceased to supply the new corporation with its products and proceeded
to market them in the area through an newly-organized wholly-owned subsidiary
The Court said that the facts pleaded in the complaint indicated only the
existence of a joint venture among three individuals, no corporation being a party
to it, and that this joint venture could not be carried on by individuals through
18. Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hov.'itals in New York, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 419,
438 (1952).

19. See note 2 supra.

20. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1951).
21. 3 N.Y.2d 444, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1957).
22. 2 A.D.2d 685, 152 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1956).

